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ALLEN GLADE KALLAS, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
MAGI OLSON KALLAS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16,619 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant is appealing a conviction of civil 
contempt which was entered for failure to obey a child 
visitation order while said visitation order was pending 
appeal. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff-Appellant was found to be guilty of contempt 
on September 20, 1979, by Judge George E. Ballif in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order finding 
him in contempt of court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant were divorced on September 
15, 1977, with the custody of their three children being 
awarded to the defendant. (R.20) (Unless otherwise stated, 
all record citations are to the record of the initial appeal 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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from the visitation order, case number 16,481.). Approximately 
one week after the decree was entered, the defendant told 
the plaintiff that she didn't want custody of the children 
any more and that he should come and get them. (R.167) The 
Court awarded custody of the children to the plaintiff on 
September 23, 1977, pursuant to a stipulation between the 
parties. This order allowed the defendant "reasonable 
visitation rights." (R.25) 
In May of 1978, the defendant called the plaintiff and 
in the course of their conversation informed plaintiff that 
she was a lesbian, and was involved in the use of illegal 
drugs. (R.170) Plaintiff later discovered that the defend-
ant was living in an apartment with her lesbian lover and a 
' male homosexual, (R.116-117), and that she had propositioned 
a young girl under the age of fourteen for the purpose of 
.sex. (R.121-122,141-143) 
On August 3, 1978, the plaintiff moved the lower court 
for an Order to Show Cause to modify and restrict the 
visitation rights of the defendant on the grounds that the 
defendant was engaged in illegal use of drugs and was an 
admitted lesbian. On January 16, 1979, the defendant also 
petitioned the lower court for an order setting forth her 
visitation rights. ( R. 48) 
The matter was tried on February 20, 1979. At trial, 
the court refused to hear much of the evidence offered by 
plaintiff which tended to prove the extent of the defendant's 
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homosexual activities, (R.147-148), her involvement with 
illegal drugs, (R.126); and the danger such practices may be 
to defendant's visiting children. (R.157) On April 19, 
1979, the court granted to the defendant overnight 
visitation rights on the first and third weekends of each 
month. The defendant was also awarded attorney's fees •. 
( R. 71) 
The plaintiff appealed the visitation order to this 
court and that appeal is currently pending (case number 
16,481). The plaintiff refused to allow any visits under 
the order and requested that the trial court stay execution 
on the order while the appeal was pending. In an order 
dated May 15, 1979, the court granted the stay of execution 
in regards to the money judgment for the attorney's fees but 
refused to stay execution of the visitation portion. The 
.court approved a supersedeas bond in the amount of $1,500.00. 
It also found plaintiff in contempt of court for failure to 
allow visitation. No penalty was invoked on the condition 
that plaintiff henceforth comply with the order. Plaintiff. 
however, continued to fear for the welfare of the children 
The defendant again sought to have the plaintiff held 
in contempt for allegedly refusing to allow visitation and 
an evidentiary hearing regarding the contempt charge was 
conducted on July 27, 1979, before the Honorable Judge Allen 
B. Sorensen in Division II. The plaintiff, defendant and 
several others testified at this hearing and afterwards 
Judge Sorensen made numerous findings of fact. (R.42-43, 
-3-
..... ~~ .... 
"/;' ~[j 
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 16619) However, no conclusions of law were reached 
and the Judge made no decision regarding the guilt or innocence 
of the plaintiff. Judge Sorensen apparently felt that it 
would be inappropriate for him to decide the contempt charge 
so he forwarded his findings of fact to Judge Ballif in 
Division III for the rendering of the decision. (R.4,Ccase 
No. 16619) Judge Ballif found the plaintiff guilty on 
September 20, 1979, based solely on the findings of fact of 
Judge Sorensen and fined the plaintiff $300.00, twenty days 
in jail suspended and $300.00 in attorney's fees. (R.8-11, 
.Case No. 16619) It is this judgment from which plaintiff is 
appealing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTEMPT CITATION WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
THE VISITATION ORDER WAS STAYED PENDING 
THE APPEAL. 
A. The Supersedeas Bond Filed By the Plaintiff Stayed 
~xecution of the Visitation Order. The plaintiff posted a 
Supersedeas Bond in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($1,500.00) when he initiated his appeal of the 
visitation order. This supersedeas bond was approved by the 
trial court on May 15, 1979. Having met these requirements, 
plaintiff is entitled to a stay of execution pursuant to 
Rule 62(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
Stay on.Appeai. When an appeal is 
taken, the appellant by giving a 
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, 
unless such a stay is otherwise 
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prohibited by law or these rules. 
The bond may be given at or after 
the time of filing a notice of 
appeal. The stay-is ef~ective 
when a supersedeas bond is approved 
by the court. (Emphasis added) 
The trial court was powerless to enforce the visitation 
order once the plaintiff had perfected his appeal and posted 
supersedeas bond. This was stated in Hidden-Meadows.Deveiop-
ment Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah~l979), 
where this court said that "the purpose and effect of super-
sedeas is to restrain the successful party and the lower 
court from taking affirmative action to enforce a judgment 
or decree." 
In the Minute Entry which approved. plaintiff's super-
sedeas bond, the court ruled that it would stay the portions 
of its decree relating to the property settlement between 
the parties, but that it would not stay the portion of the 
order relating to visitation. However, Rule 62(d) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure states that "the stay is effec~ive 
when the supersedeas~bond is approved by the court." 
The trial court's authority was limited to the approval 
or disapproval of the supersedeas bond. No where was it 
given the power to chose which portions of the decree will 
be stayed on appeal. 
B. A Stay of Execution Pending.Appeal-Is-A Matter-of 
Right In Custody Cases. While this court has not yet ruled 
on this point, it is the law in many jurisdictions that an 
appeal in a custody case acts as an automatic stay of 
-5-
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execution which deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to 
enforce the order under appeal. While there is no dispute 
as to permanent custody in the present case, it is obvious 
that the visitation order here is an award of temporary 
custody and control over the children. The same policy 
considerations should control whether dealing with full 
or part-time custody. 
In Hunt v~ Superior Court, 21 Ariz.App.96,515 P.2d 1194, 
1195 (1973), the court held that it was wrongful for a trial 
court to refuse a stay pending appeal to a father appealing 
an order which deprived him of custody of his children. The 
court stated: 
In Allison v. Chatwin, 99 Ariz.99,407 
P.2d 69 (1965), and a line of earlier 
cases cited therein, our Supreme Court 
held that when an appeal is filed in 
a case in which custody of children is 
changed by the lower court, it is 
the duty of the court upon applica-
tion to fix a supersedeas bond, the 
purpose of which is to preserve the 
status quo on the case pending appeal. 
It is not within the power of-the lower 
court to award custody of children tem-
porarily pending appeal. The purpose 
of the supersedeas bond is to afford 
the party appealing from a lower court 
order to stay any further proceedings 
in the cause being appealed until such 
time as the appeal has been ruled upon 
by the reviewing court. Therefore, the 
lower court, upon notice of appeal should 
determine as quickly as possible the 
amount of the supersedeas bond, stay 
execution for a reasonable time to 
permit the party appealing to post the 
bond, and thereafter stay and preserve 
the status quo. 
In Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676,242 P.2d 321, 
-6-
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325 (1952), a mother sought to restrain the trial court from 
allowing the removal of her child from the jurisdiction 
while her custody appeal was pending. The California 
Supreme Court held that the lower court had no jurisdiction 
to alter the status quo while the appeal was pending. It 
said: 
A litigant in a custody action is entitled 
to appellate review before his rights are 
finally determined. If the appellant is 
not protected from adverse action by the 
trial court that would destroy the fruits 
of his appeal, the right of appeal is 
illusory. In contending that the trial 
court can permit removal of the children 
pending appeal, Clarence, [the father] in 
effect, contends that the custody orders 
should be immediately executed and not 
stayed by appeal. The statutes and de-
cisions of this state are opposed to this 
contention, although some states have a 
contrary rule. 
The above rule was also applied in Appiication of 
Frost, 134 Cal.App.2d 619,286 P.2d 378,379 (1955), a case 
almost identical to the present one. In Frost, the trial 
court entered an order changing the custody of the parties' 
child from the father to the mother. The father was cited 
for contempt when he refused to relinquish custody of the 
child while the appeal was pending. The court of appeal 
reversed the contempt conviction stating: 
An appeal from an order modifying the 
custody provisions of a divorce decree 
suspends the power of the trial court 
to enforce such order. The perfected 
appeal automatically constitutes a 
stay of proceedings and precludes the 
trial court from interfering with cus-
tody as it existed at the time of the 
-7-
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appeal. In Re Barr, 39 Cal.2d 25,D43 
P.2d 787. 
For further support of this rule~ the court should see 
Murphy v. Murphy, 64 Nev.481,184 P.2d 1004 (1947); Prescott v. 
Prescott, 97 Id.257,542 P.2d 1176 (1975); waikow-v. Walkow, 
-
36 Wash.2d 510,219 P.2d 108 (1950); and Application of Orlando, 
124 Cal.App.2d 594,269 P.2d 45 (1954). 
This court has long recognized in other types of cases, 
the importance of maintaining the status quo between the 
parties during an appeal. In Bullion,-Beck and Champion 
Mining Company v. Eureka Hill Mining Company, 5 Utah 147,13 
P.174, 175 (1887),this court held that the trial court was 
powerless to enforce a mandatory injunction while an appeal 
on that injunction was pending. This court said: 
The taking of the appeal and the giving 
of the supersedeas bond did not make 
void or nullify or suspend the judgment, 
nor the injunction contained therein, 
but all affirmative action looking to 
the execution of the terms of the decree 
were suspended. The district court during 
the pendency of the appeal, could do no 
act which d.id not look to the holding of 
the subject of litigation just as it exist-
ed when the decree was rendered. In the 
exercise of its authority to preserve the 
property, the district court was empowered 
to punish as for contempt for the violation 
of any provision of the injunction, where 
the parties were not allowing the property 
to remain as it was on the date of the de-
cree. If this were not so, the recovery 
in the appellate court might often be a 
barren victory. 
In the case of Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350,289 P.588, 
589 (1930), the petitioner had been threatened with contempt 
for refusing to obey a court order while it was being appealed. 
-8-
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In granting a writ of prohibition which forbade the contempt 
prosecution, this court said: 
The judgment in the main action, from 
which the appeal was taken and which 
was superseded, was, in legal effect 
by the appeal and supersedeas~ vacated 
and rendered inoperative, the authority 
of the court below terminated and pre-
vented from further proceeding with re-
spect to any matter involved in the 
subject matter of the appeal, or-to 
take any action which amounted~n 
execution or enforcement of the judg~ 
ment, or which effected the subject 
matter of the appeal, and the case 
left with all its incidences precisely 
as it stood before the rendition of a 
judgment in the court below. • • though 
the judgment in the district court was 
a final judgment for purposes of the 
appeal, yet, because of the appeal and 
the supersedeas, was not a final deter-
mination of the rights of the parties 
in and to the subject matter of the 
litigation, until a determination by 
this court. 
Maintaining the status quo in cases involving the 
·custody or visitation of children is especially important. 
An erroneous trial court judgment may result in irreparable 
physical and emotional harm to the children if it is 
enforced before it can be reversed on appeal. 
The plaintiff in the present case, believes that the 
trial court order allowing overnight visitation with the 
defendant is erroneous and hazardous to the welfare of his 
children. This belief is based on substantial evidence that 
the defendant mother is involved in homosexual affairs and 
the abuse of illegal drugs, and that she freely associates 
in her apartment with other persons of similar habits. The 
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plaintiff has a right to keep his children out of such an 
environment until and unless there is a final determination 
by this Court that such an environment will not be physically 
or emotionally harmful to them. To allow the trial court to 
make this determination pending this appeal is to give the 
lower court power which cannot be checked by the appellate 
process. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE BELIEF IN HIS RIGHT 
TO A STAY OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL PRE-
CLUDES HIS BEING CONVICTED OF CONTEMPT. 
The plaintiff should not be found guilty of contempt 
even if this Court finds that he had no right to a stay of 
execution because any reasonable person in his position 
would have acted in the same manner. Plaintiff was ordered 
to immediately comply with a decree which he reasonably felt 
would be harmful to his children without. the opportunity of 
having had that decree reviewed on appeal. Since Utah has 
long followed the policy of maintaining the status quo 
pending appeal, and other jurisdictions explicitly hold that 
execution in custody cases is stayed pending appeal, the 
plaintiff was reasonable in believing that immediate 
enforcement of the decree was beyond the jurisdiction of the 
trial court and he was reasonable in refusing to subject his 
children to the risk of harm pursuant to an invalid order. 
Plaintiff's position is supported in the case of In Re 
Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 190 P.952 (1920), where the attorneys 
of a litigate were convicted of contempt for advising their 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
client to disobey a court order. This court reversed the 
convictions on the grounds that the advice had been based on 
a reasonable view of the law at the time it was given even 
though such view was not later adopted by this court. This 
court stated: 
If, therefore, the appellants had.good 
cause to believe, and in good faith did 
believe, that the order in question was 
in excess of the court's power or juris-
diction, or that it was improvidently 
issued and for that reason vulner-
able ••• it was their duty to assail 
the order in a proper manner and at 
the proper time, and to advise their 
client to that effect. We have very 
carefully read all of the evidence 
and the proceedings in this case and, 
after doing so, and without pausing 
here to set forth the evidence, have 
been forced to the conclusion that 
what was said and done by counsel, in 
view of all the circumstances, does not 
constitute a criminal contempt. The · 
conviction is forced upon us that the 
appellant Thomas, who was first called 
upon for advice in the best of faith 
assumed that the order of the court 
could be successfully assailed upon 
several grounds. • • The question had 
not been before the courts in this jur-
isdiction, and therefore had not been 
decided. Moreover, there are some res-
pectable authorities which support [the 
advice given]. True, we have since held 
the law to be otherwise in this juris-
diction. The question was, however, an 
open one at the time the alleged contempt 
was committed, and hence any lawyer would 
have been justified in assailing such 
an order. • • We are clearly of the opin-
ion, therefore, that under all the circum-
stances appellants had a clear legal right 
to assail the order in question, and there-
fore their conduct and that of the cashier 
in refusing to comply with the order forth-
with did not constitute contempt. 
-11-
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POINT III 
A CONVICTION OF CIVIL CONTEMPT FALLS IF THE 
UNDERLYING ORDER IS REVERSED ON APPEAL. 
While the validity of the violated order is irrelevant 
in cases of criminal contempt, it is critical in cases of 
civil contempt. It is stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d 48, Contempt 
§42 that: 
Courts may distinguish between civil and 
criminal contempts with respect to the 
invalidity of the allegedly violated order. 
Thus, it has been stated by a federal 
court that in criminal contempt proceedings 
based on the violation of a court order, the 
validity of that order is not open to ques-
tion in the slightest degree, and that dis-
obedience constitutes a contempt, even ~hough 
the oider is set aside on appeal or otherwise 
becomes ineffective. In contrast, a charge 
of civil contempt is said to fall with the 
violated order, if it is determined that the 
order was erroneously or wrongfully issued. 
This rule is confirmed in the case of United States 
.. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 u.s. 258,294,67 
S.Ct.677,91 L.Ed.884 (1946), where the Court held that, 
It does not follow, of course, that 
simply because a defendant may be pun-
ished for criminal contempt for dis-
obedience of an order later set aside 
on appeal, that the plaintiff in the 
action may profit by way of a fine 
imposed in a simultaneous proceeding 
for civil contempt based upon a vio-
lation of the same order. The right 
to remedial relief falls with an in-
junction which events prove was errone-
ously issued. 
The rationale for this rule is that a conviction of 
civil contempt is primarily intended to coerce a performance 
for the benefit of one of the parties; while a conviction of 
-12-
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criminal contempt is intended to defend the authority of the 
court. In Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So.2d 87 (Fla.App. 
1975), the court stated that: 
While there may be some elements of 
punishment involved in a civil contempt, 
the primary purpose is to secure com-
pliance with the court's order for the 
benefit of the opposing party. On the 
other hand, as stated by the Supreme 
Court in Demetree, supra, "a contempt 
proceeding criminal in nature is in-
stituted solely and simply to vindi-
cate the authority of the court or 
otherwise punish for conduct offensive 
to the public in violation of an order 
of the court." 
A civil contempt order falls after the violated order 
is reversed because the party intended to be benefited by it 
is not entitled t_o relief after the underlying order is 
invalidated. 
It is clear that the present case involves a civil 
contempt charge. The order was issued at the request of 
the defendant for the purpose of coercing the plaintiff 
into allowing the defendant to have the children for over-
night visitation. In Faircloth, supra, the court said that: 
It is obvious that a contempt commit-
ment issued as the result of a party's 
failure to comply with the requirements 
of a final judgment of dissolution of 
marriage is a civil contempt rather than 
a criminal contempt (unless such failure 
consists in doing a forbidden act injur-
ious to the opposite party in which event 
it may be a criminal contempt). 
This court must, therefore, consider the validity of 
the visitation order appealed from in case number 16481 
before deciding the present appeal because a valid initial 
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court order is a prerequisite to a valid civil contempt 
conviction. 
POINT IV 
A CONVICTION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT 
MAY BE RENDERED ONLY AFTER A FULL 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND ONLY BY THE 
JUDGE WHO PRESIDED OVER THAT HEARING. 
The procedure under which the contempt conviction was 
rendered was clearly improper. A person accused of indirect 
contempt is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under U.C.A. 
§78-32-9 which states: 
When the person arrested has been brought 
up or has appeared the court or judge must 
proceed to investigate the charge, and must 
hear any answer which the person arrested 
may make to the same, and may examine wit-
nesses for or against him: for which an ad-
journment may be had from time to time, if 
necessary. 
It should be obvious that such a hearing must be before 
the judge who must rule on the order. This is implicit in 
the language of §78-32-9 which states that "the court or 
judge must proceed to investigate the charge": and is the 
only procedure consistant with due process and common sense. 
To separate the hearing of evidence from the judge who must 
decide the case is to put the latter judge. in the dark. 
Without the opportunity to hear all of the evidence and 
observe the witnesses, his decision cannot be an informed 
one. It would be completely dependent on the propriety of 
the first judge's findings of fact. Such a procedure 
subverts the policy of having decisions made by an inde-
pendent, well-informed judiciary and compels some judges to 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
act as rubber-stamps for decisions effectively made by 
other judges. 
Such a procedure is directly contrary to Rule 63(a) 
U.R.C.P. which governs the powers of a succeeding judge in a 
case where the original judge is unable to continue. Rule 
63(a) states: 
If by reason of death, sickness or other 
disability, a judge before whom an action 
has been tried is unable to perform the 
duties to be performed by the court under 
these Rules after-a-verdict is returned or 
findings-of-fact and conclusions of law are 
filed, then any other judge regularly sitting 
in or assigned to the court in which the action 
was tried may perform those duties; but if 
such other judge is satisfied that he cannot 
perform those duties because he did not 
preside at the trial or for any other.reason, 
he may in his discretion grant a new trial. 
(Emphasis added) 
The procedure in the present case is clearly in violation 
of this rule. First, Judge Sorensen was not sick or disabled 
in any way contemplated by the statute. Second, the case 
was transferred to Judge Ballif after the evidence was 
presented and findings of fact were made, but before a 
verdict or conclusions of law were reached. Indeed, the 
case was transferred so that Judge Ballif could find the 
conclusions of law and reach a verdict. The Rule explicitly 
requires a verdict or findings of fact and conclusions of 
law be made before another judge can be substituted. 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with this interpreta-
tion of Rule 63. In Appiication of Pioneer Mill Company, 53 
Haw. 573,497 P.2d 549,555 fn.5 (1972) the court said: 
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The normal rule, of course, is that only 
the judge who conducted the trial may en-
ter a de.cision in a case. Atlas Financial 
Corp. v. Oliver; Vt.; 274 A.2d 687 (1971~ 
Cram v. Bach, l Wis.2d 378, 83 N.W. 
2d 877, 85 N.W.2d 673 (1957). Rule 
63 of the Haw.Rules of Civ.Pro., ••• 
enables one judge to perform duties in 
a case after a disabled judge has re-
turned a verdict or filed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. The rule 
seeks to allow the successor judge to 
complete the formal acts necessary to 
conclude the litigations, such as enter-
ing formal judgment, issuing injunctions, 
awarding costs; and hearing post trial 
motions. However; the rule can only be 
invoked where a complete and final de-
cision has been rendered by the disabled 
judge. The danger that one judge might 
misinterpret a prior judge's informal 
notes or oral statements, or err in attempt-
ing to judge the credibility of witnesses 
. from a transcript is thought to be suf-
ficiently great that the judicial system 
should be put to the inconvenience of con-
ducting a new trial. Bromberg v. Moul, 
275 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1960). 
There have been numerous cases in which a substitute 
judge has been allowed to perform various post verdict 
duties after the disability of the initial judge. As noted 
above, however, in each case; these duties pertained only to 
formal and routine procedures done after the decision in the 
case. In State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah, 1975), for 
example, this Court allowed a substitute judge to sign 
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, but only 
after the trial judge had reached a verdict and made his own 
findings and conclusions. There are no cases which appellant 
has found which allow the actual decision in a case to be 
made by a judge who did not hear the evidence. 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Judge Sorensen transferred this case pursuant to case 
authority which he felt prevented him from hearing a case 
involving contempt against his own court. (R.43, Case No. 
16619) Whether or not he was required to make this transfer 
is irrelevant. It was improper either way. If he was bound 
to transfer the action~ he was bound to transfer the entire 
action. He could not transfer just the decision making 
functions while hearing the evidence himself. Such a 
division would defeat any purpose behind the rule requiring 
the transfer in the first place. The contemnor would still· 
be subject to possible prejudice from the judge he contemned. 
If the judge was not required under the law to· transfer the 
action then he was not legally disabled under Rule 63(a) 
U.R.C.P., and the substituting judge had no power to act in· 
the case. 
The procedure resorted to here, while done for the best 
of motives, was clearly improper. The appellant ~ost most 
of the benefit of the hearing required by U.C.A. 78-32-9 
because the deciding judge was not present at such hearing~ 
Judge Ballif was unable to consider any explanations or 
mitigating facts offered by the plaintiff because his 
decision was based solely on the findings of fact made by 
Judge Sorensen (R.9,Case No. 16619) The plaintiff was thus 
effectively deprived of his right to a hearing and his 
conviction must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court clearly exceeded its authority in 
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convicting the appellant of contempt. Not only was its 
procedure totally improper but appellant was entitled to a 
stay of execution during the pendancy of his appeal under 
the long standing decisions of this court and because he had 
met the statutory requirements for a stay under Rule 62(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, appellant's 
disobedience of the court's order was based on a reasonable 
and good faith belief in its invalidity. Such reasonable 
action, even if it later is decided to be incorrect, cannot 
be the basis of a contempt conviction. 
Finally, this Court must consider the validity of the 
initial visitation order in conjunction with this appeal. 
The conviction of contempt cannot stand if that order is 
reversed. To do otherwise would allow a father to be 
punished for acts this Court may later decide to be in the 
best interests of the children involved. 
Respectfully submitted this /.i~day of December, 1979. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief to Mr. 
William w. Downes, Jr., 214 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, this /elf/; day of December, 1979. 
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